In search of new sources of legitimacy

by Islah Jad

The death of the historical leader Yasser Arafat has left a dangerous political vacuum that the Palestinian people now have to find the best possible way to fill. Presidential elections are one of the ways being pursued to fill this vacuum and to establish a new source of legitimacy for a Palestinian leadership, whether from Arafat's party (Fateh) or from outside it.

Arafat, who did not care much about involving the political institutions in the decision-making process, owed much of his legitimacy to his charisma, his use of symbolism and his populism. His charisma was in large part due to his ability to be one of the people: he lived a spartan lifestyle and spoke to people in a language shorn of any affectation. His life was representative of the suffering of the Palestinian people: he, as they, was exiled from one Arab city to the other and marginalized and persecuted by all Arab regimes. He was also adept at using symbolism: the kefeyya, the military uniform, and the discourse of pain, sacrifice and return all resonated strongly with millions of Palestinian refugees and exiles. After his return to the homeland, Arafat did not try to change the basis of his legitimacy and was thus not interested in building viable Palestinian political institutions. The lack of such institutions explains why his death caused such anxiety among the Palestinian people.

Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), who is part of the remaining historical leadership, has not got, and seemingly does not want, the same sources of legitimacy as Arafat. Abbas speaks his mind even if it isn't popular; he avoids symbolism and dresses in a western-style suit. A wealthy man, he does not pretend to represent those who suffer among the poor. He wants to base his legitimacy on general suffrage, or sound democratic rules, and the involvement of political institutions, in particular those of Fateh. As a strategy to deal with the Israeli occupation, he advocates negotiations and does not offer an alternative should such a strategy fail to achieve national aspirations.

Abu Mazen has been strongly challenged by a younger leader whose appeal rests on similar bases to Arafat. Marwan Barghouti presents himself, not only as the representative of the poor and marginalized refugees, but also of the historically neglected peasants from whose ranks he comes. His flamboyant discourse of challenge, resistance, sacrifice and negotiation resembles that of Hamas, but with secular connotations. This discourse finds a ready audience among poor youth, in particular those in Fateh who have often been treated as mere fuel for the maneuvers of the political leadership.

Even though Barghouti has now stood aside, he nevertheless represents a strong political current within the ranks of Fateh. His is the Fateh of the masses as opposed to the Fateh of the elite; the Fateh youth versus Fateh's historical leadership; Fateh the militant versus Fateh the diplomat; and Fateh the poor versus Fateh the rich.

And in an attempt to win the internal battle between the two Fatehs and challenge the traditional leadership by bringing into question their legitimacy within the party, Marwan is calling for internal Fateh elections at all levels. He is thus using the presidential election as a form of primary for the contest within Fateh, and in doing so highlighting the fact that Fateh's "official choice" to run for president (Abu Mazen) did not undergo a rigorous process of selection from among the party's base. He acts as a reminder to the national political institutions and representatives that their legitimacy derives from their popular base--an important contribution to the Palestinian political system.

The harsh reaction of "official" Fateh against Marwan's candidacy would seem to be an attempt to undermine those who want to establish their legitimacy on a sound democratic basis. The desire to represent Fateh with one voice is essentially undemocratic. The party has different political currents within it. Allowing these differences to surface, in this case through a second presidential candidate, is a healthy democratic step, though it may be destructive to the party itself.

Furthermore, sound popular backing will importantly provide the elected leader greater legitimacy to face the coming regional and international pressures. This will be necessary in any dealings with Israel, which is adept at using the "threat" of a strong right wing to tie the hands of Israeli negotiators and shrug off international pressure. That is also a reason the traditional practice of downplaying differences within Fateh might not be the best way to deal with internal opposition.

Outside Fateh, the withdrawals of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the PFLP from the presidential race leave more room to independents. Mustapha Barghouti portrays himself as the representative of a 'third way', neither political Islam nor Fateh's mainstream nationalism. Instead, Barghouti, aware of the importance of the discourse of resistance and sacrifice, seeks to build his source of legitimacy on non-violent popular resistance as manifested in the mobilization against the Israeli separation wall. Understanding also the importance of the role of international public opinion, Barghouti has highlighted his ability to address that sector, on the formal and informal levels, as a way to boost his domestic standing and in an attempt at building a power base among the "silent independents" and the youth, as well as those dissatisfied with Fateh or Hamas' policies, whether they be in the business sector or professionals.

Barghouti is also taking a leaf out of Hamas' book. By utilizing networks he developed from his work in the Medical Relief Committees, an influential NGO in the health provision sector, Barghouti hopes to transform his erstwhile service recipients into an organized constituency. It is important to note that the bureaucracy, networks, leadership and strategy needed to run an NGO are different than those needed to build a political movement or organization. The latter is based on shared goals, voluntarism, sustainable commitments and well-coordinated collective action. If he is successful in this project, Barghouti's example might set an important precedent for the many NGOs in the Arab world to transform themselves from urban elite NGOs into popular movements, whether social or political ones. In doing so, they may be finally able to obtain some real political power and compete with both the Islamic movements and ruling parties.

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- Published 13/12/2004 (c) bitterlemons.org. Used here with permission.

Islah Jad teaches women's studies and cultural studies at Birzeit University.