Uncertainties and challenges

by Ramin Jahanbegloo

Two years ago, when the United States became engaged in a war against Saddam Hussein, many commentators on the Middle East in general and on Iranian politics in particular, as well as the majority of Iranians inside and outside Iran, quickly concluded that the true reason for the US military action against Iraq was in fact to destabilize the Iranian regime. At the same time, Iranian officials recognized that democratic developments in Iraq might send ripples across the border and create a series of civil rebellions inside Iran.

Today, democratic developments in Iraq are taking a slower pace than what was expected, and the Iranian population has no more hope of a future American intervention in Iran. Following the 2004 US election and the advent of a second four-year term for the Bush administration, many in Iran, in Israel and in the Arab countries are eager to see how President Bush achieves his lofty goals of a democratic, peaceful and nuclear-free Middle East. In this regard, the year 2005 will witness a rare confluence of uncertainties and challenges in the Middle East--elections in Iraq, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt, presidential elections in Iran, as well as Iranian-European talks on nuclear disarmament--that might help to create a new rapprochement between the United States and the region.

Certainly, the first issue for policymakers in the Middle East will be to determine an exit date for the US-led coalition in Iraq. The longer US troops stay in Iraq, the more the US presence will undoubtedly be seen as an occupation by the Arab street. Perhaps the best alternative for the new Iraqi government would be to go to the United Nations, which mandated the current coalition, and request a replacement force. This measure would allow others, especially European countries such as France and Germany, to play a bigger role in the stabilization of Iraq.

As long as US troops are in Iraq, the democratic transition in the Middle East will be a failure and the principles laid out in the roadmap will fail to end terrorist violence against Israel and to produce a stable Palestinian state. To make progress in the direction of peace in the Middle East, the US and its partners can offer several incentives.

First, they can require Israel to freeze Jewish settlements and to acknowledge that dismantlement eventually will include West Bank settlements.

Second, they can mobilize international resources to help the new Palestinian government and its poor economy.

Third, they should press Egyptian President Husni Mubarak to lift prohibitive laws in Egypt and empower the liberal and progressive elements of Egyptian society against the Islamic fundamentalists.

Fourth, they can challenge Iran with diplomacy by ending 25 years of containment against this country. The key is to find ways that address concerns on both sides. This could include Iran terminating its nuclear enrichment program and its support for extremist Palestinian groups and Shi'ites in Iraq in exchange for security guarantees in a vulnerable nuclear neighborhood and the eviction of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, the largest Iranian opposition group, from Iraq.

Behind various closed doors, the leaders of the Islamic Republic have reached the conclusion that Iran would do best not to associate itself too closely with the Americans. Nonetheless, Tehran has repeatedly stated that it wants to be part of an international, UN-led effort against terrorism, though not one that is unilaterally spearheaded by Washington. Tehran is likely to make limited bargains with the Americans. As an indication of such willingness to cooperate, Iran has kept the door open for a limited dialogue with the US through a number of direct and indirect channels.

Arguably, what has the most impact on Iran is the threatening tone adopted by the United States. This issue goes considerably beyond the famous "you are either with us or with the terrorists" quote of President Bush. Now that the Americans have overthrown the Taliban and Saddam, the Iranian leaders, mistrustful of the Americans to start with, are obviously deeply concerned with the issue, not knowing if Washington would turn on regimes like that in Tehran. According to some analysts, Iran's "toothless policy" has given Washington the assurance it needs that Iran will play its part and be a good sideline observer in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

Some supporters of democratization in Iran might come to see the US threat as a way to accelerate reform. But this presumes that democratization really matters to the Bush administration. If this is the case, Bush administration endorsement of the student movement may already have helped hardliners legitimate their suppression of intellectuals, journalists and students as a measure to guard against "foreign forces". If this is not the case, the Islamic regime is less likely to respond to US threats by conceding democracy and human rights to Iranian citizens, than by offering concessions such as oil deals and a cooperative stance regarding weapons of mass destruction and the future of Iraq.

This is another way of saying that it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between Iran's domestic and foreign policies. The fact that they are intertwined exposes the Iranian state to both domestic and external legitimacy crises with which it has to come to grips. Iran will have to cooperate more with the international community if it wishes to avoid the isolation that it experienced for the past 25 years.

In parallel, the grand expectations formulated by President Bush during the first term of his presidency are far from being satisfied. The Bush administration now faces new challenges and opportunities during its second term, which will require a greater diplomatic engagement and perhaps a more imaginative attitude toward Iran and the Arab-Israel problem

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- Published 6/1/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org. Used here with permission.

Dr. Ramin Jahanbegloo is an Iranian philosopher and political analyst. He is the director of the Department for Contemporary Studies at the Cultural Research Bureau in Tehran and the author of 20 books in English, French and Persian. His last book, Iran: Between Tradition and Modernity (2004) is published by Lexington Press in Washington, DC.