Understanding the Egyptian paradox

by Abdel Monem Said Aly

Signs of improvement in Egyptian-Israeli relations are abundant. Understanding the complexities of the Egyptian side of the relationship requires multiple perspectives.

For a start, it was Magid Abdel Fatah, the ex-spokesman of President Mubarak, who said that good Egyptian-Israeli relations should be the norm. Indeed it is only under exceptional circumstances that these relations deteriorate. The reality reflected in this statement is that the Egyptian posture toward peace with Israel has been a strategic posture no matter what circumstances negatively affect their interactions. In a way, the recent positive developments in the relationship are a testimony to the tenacity of the peace agreement and its capacity to endure difficult regional developments, such as the Israeli war in Lebanon and two Palestinian intifadas.

However, Egyptian-Israeli peace does not stand on its own right. It is largely influenced by developments on the other Arab-Israel tracks, particularly the Palestinian track. From the time of Camp David I, Egypt has had to negotiate with Israel within two frameworks for peace: one for Egypt and one for Palestine. In the Egyptian mind, the two tracks were never separated.

The developments in the occupied Palestinian territories since the outbreak of the intifada in September 2000 made the deterioration of Egyptian-Israeli relations just a matter of time. Now, in contrast, the possible improvement in the Palestinian question through Sharon's disengagement plan has paved the road for the current improvement. The death of Yasser Arafat, the election of Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas), and the possible renewal of Palestinian negotiations all open the gates for more improvements.

Yet Egyptian-Israeli relations are a function not only of Palestinian-Israeli or even Arab-Israel relations. The domestic economic and political situation in Egypt plays its part. It is not a coincidence that Egyptian-Israeli relations have deteriorated at times of declining Egyptian economic fortunes. Following a growth rate of between five and six percent in the second half of the 1990s, the Egyptian economy went through a recession that dropped the rate of growth to about 2.5 percent in the first three years of the new century. With a population growth rate of about two percent, Egypt was not growing at all.

Part of this downturn in the Egyptian economy can be attributed to the regional instability generated by the Palestinian-Israeli confrontations. But by mid-2004, Egypt was about to review its reform policies, and with a new cabinet in July geo-economic concerns overpowered geo-political ones. The official Egyptian justification to the Egyptian public for signing the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) deal with Israel was tightly linked to the way the deal contributes to Egypt's economic indicators, particularly unemployment. The deal to release Israeli prisoner Azzam Azzam was necessary to open the way for further relaxation of the regional situation, and to make further deals in trade and gas possible.

It is also essential, however, to see Egyptian moves toward Israel as a part of the Egyptian regional posture in 2004. For Egypt, the American war in Iraq and its consequences in terms of the insurgency, the Israeli-Palestinian confrontations, and the continuation of the civil war in Sudan--all have destabilized the entire Middle East. The "swamps" of terrorism in the region have been expanding, and radical forces in Iran and elsewhere have been boosted.

An unstable Middle East is not an environment in which Egyptian national interests are served. Creating stability has been the traditional business of Egypt during the past three decades. Therefore, Egypt moved to help the Americans in Iraq through the Sharm El-Sheikh summit that legitimized the American presence in Baghdad. Cairo also moved to support the peace process in Sudan through to its conclusion on January 9, 2005. Nonetheless, the Israel-Arab peace will continue to be the cornerstone of regional stability in the Middle East.

Improving Egyptian-Israeli relations is an important starting point. President George W. Bush and his team will continue in the White House for the next four years. Turning this into an opportunity rather than a liability required the improvement of Egyptian-Israeli relations. This in turn will help improve Egyptian-American relations, which reached a low point following Washington's talk of wholesale reforms in the Middle East, talk that was bound to touch on Egyptian sensibilities.

In a way, Egyptian-American relations have now reached a higher energy level, insofar as the Egyptian-Israeli peace has been the cornerstone of the relationship between Cairo and Washington. Thus, following the improvement in Israeli-Egyptian relations the US was not only ready to sign the QIZ protocol, but also to negotiate a free trade agreement, release $300 million in funds assigned to Egypt to compensate it for the Iraq war's negative impact, and upgrade Egypt again to its rightful place in Washington.

All in all, the Egyptian-Israeli relationship is a function of the peace treaty, Arab-Israel peace or war, the Egyptian domestic situation, the Egyptian regional role, and the relationship between Cairo and Washington. Understanding these variables and there interactions is necessary for an understanding of Egyptian positions.

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- Published 13/1/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org. Used here with permission.

Abdel Monem Said Aly is the director of the al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo.