Flawed but a landmark

by Joshua Muravchik

The January 30 elections in Iraq will be marred by violence, administrative failings, and boycotts. Yet, however flawed, the voting is likely to be a landmark in the history of Iraq and the region.

The violence and threats have already harmed the campaign by making it difficult or impossible for some candidates to campaign in public. But Iraq is far from being the first country in which elections have been held in such circumstances, and in other cases--such as El Salvador and Cambodia--the violence did not defeat the elections. Rather, the elections helped bring an end to the violence.

That Iraqis want this election is demonstrated by the fact that some 7,500 candidates have filed to run for the 250 seats, a ratio of 30 candidates for every seat. And despite the obstacles, public opinion soundings show that except in a few provinces, Iraqis will vote in large numbers. This will be the most meaningful exercise of popular sovereignty in the country's history.

The government that it will produce may have various faults or virtues, but it will consist of Iraqis chosen by Iraqis. The American (and allied) military presence in the country will not disappear overnight, but the foreign troops will remain only at the request of the Iraqi government and under conditions set by that government.

Of course its enemies will call it a "puppet," but this will not be too convincing. For anyone who looks at events with open eyes, it is apparent that the Americans had nothing to do with putting together the various slates. The slate expected to win the most votes was organized under the aegis of Ayatollah Sistani. Sistani has cooperated to a considerable degree with the Americans, but no Iraqi will believe that he owes his allegiance to them.

As a result, the violent opposition will be weakened. Radical Islamists (including foreigners) and hardline Baathists may want to fight to the bitter end, but those Iraqis who have joined the resistance just because they hate the foreign occupation may be persuaded to give the new government a chance. Indeed, there is likely to be some form of dialogue between the government and these resistance elements. Perhaps they will be led to see the obvious: the sooner the violence dies down, the sooner the occupiers will leave their country.

Could it be that elections that result in a Shi'ite victory and underrepresentation of Sunnis (due to a low vote in those areas) will lead Iraq to disintegration or full-scale civil war? This is a danger, but there is reason not to expect this outcome. The Shi'ites, with the prospect of becoming the country's leading political force, have a strong incentive to work to keep the country whole rather than to exercise their majority in a vindictive or vengeful way. So far, they have shown they recognize this. Those who assembled the Sistani-backed slate took pains to include some Sunnis and Kurds as well as some secular Shi'ites. The Shi'ites have steadfastly refused to retaliate for acts of violence against them apparently designed to provoke inter-communal warfare. And they have also expressed openness to finding ways of increasing Sunni participation in the new government and in writing the new constitution in the event that the circumstances of the election leave the Sunnis without due representation. On the other side, few Sunni voices have been raised in favor of dismembering the country.

Most likely, then, the elections will be a major step toward a peaceful and democratic Iraq. They will also be felt in other Arab countries.

It is true that anger and distrust toward America are running very high. But it is easier to hate a superpower than to ignore it. America's recent advocacy of democracy in the Middle East has stirred ferment in the region, emboldening indigenous democrats and encouraging concessions by the rulers.

Last year was the year of the "initiative," pro-reform declarations issued by gatherings in Alexandria and half a dozen Arab capitals. This year, 2005, will be the year of voting. Iraq's January election will be followed by a national referendum on a new constitution in October and for a new government in December. The Palestinians have just elected a new president. Soon they will elect a new legislature and more new municipal councils. Saudi Arabia will make a small break with absolute monarchy, allowing (male) voters to choose 50 percent of the members of municipal councils. Elections have also been announced in Yemen and Oman. Electoral contests in Lebanon and Egypt, though no novelty, promise to be more meaningful than in the past. In Lebanon, a multi-confessional slate opposed to the Syrian occupation shows promise of winning seats. In Egypt, leading dissident Saad Eddin Ibrahim has said he is seeking a way to run against President Hosni Mubarak. Only four years ago, Ibrahim was thrown in jail for a much lesser act of defiance.

Of course, each of these elections will be limited or flawed, but they bespeak a momentum of democratization in the region, and the rise of the principle of popular sovereignty. All the old rationalizations for authoritarian rule increasingly ring hollow. January 2005 may be remembered as the month in which both Palestinians and Iraqis took major steps toward democracy, steps that will reverberate around the region for years to come.

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- Published 27/1/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org. Used here with permission.

Joshua Muravchik is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Among other books and writings, he is the author of Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny.