Syria's no-win situation

by Musa Keilani

The noose is tightening around Syria, and Damascus is trying to find a way out of it in the wake of accusations that it was behind the killing of Lebanon's former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and demands that it withdraw its forces from Lebanon.

In the firmest warning yet, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has demanded that Syria complete its withdrawal from Lebanon by April or face international sanctions.

Annan's warning is backed by the US and France, and there is little doubt that Damascus will find itself pushed against the wall in the days ahead if it does not take it seriously.

Damascus has responded by announcing a pullback of its forces to the Bekaa Valley and promising to cooperate with the UN team which began investigations into the Feb. 14 bombing that killed Hariri and 16 others in Beirut. The pro-Syrian government in Beirut, which is facing an uncertain no-confidence vote in parliament on Monday, has also promised to cooperate with the UN team. These could be taken as reflections of a Syrian understanding of the seriousness of the situation.

Hopefully, Damascus will not indulge in any attempt to manipulate incriminating evidence in its favour. The realities on the ground are too strong for any such attempt to succeed. These include the growing Lebanese opposition to continued Syrian military presence in Lebanon and the mounting international pressure on Damascus to accept that it can no longer hope to call all the shots in Lebanon as it did since 1976.

At this juncture in time, it does not really matter whether Syria had anything to do with the killing of its one-time ally Hariri. What matters is that those who want Syria to get out of Lebanon are now armed with the strongest weapon yet to target Damascus and press their demand, with the Syrians unable to do anything about it.

The UN investigators are expected to file a report to Annan on their findings on the Hariri killing in three weeks. Possibly, it could exonerate Syria, if indeed the Damascus assertions of innocence are true. However, it does not mean that Syria could hope to return to the pre-Feb. 14 status quo in Lebanon since the killing has given rise to expressions of strong resentment among the Lebanese against Syrian intervention in their affairs.

It would be naive for anyone to hope that Damascus could somehow hang on to its dominance in Lebanon. The US and Israel would not allow it to happen no matter what. Even if the UN team finds that the Syrians had no role in the killing of Hariri, I guess that it would come with a finding that Syria did know about the plot but did nothing about it. For, such is the conviction in view of the irrefutable fact that meticulous planning, supported by accurate intelligence information, had gone into the bombing and this required the involvement of professionals at the level of a state intelligence agency. Therefore, it follows that the Syrian intelligence in Lebanon would have had at least some inkling about what was to happen, and this in itself is enough for Damascus to be condemned in the UN investigation report.

Let us accept that Syria would meet the UN deadline for its departure from Lebanon. What happens next? Could certain forces that do not have Lebanese interests at heart try to take advantage of the situation and try to rekindle the civil war? That is an unlikely prospect. The lessons that the Lebanese have learnt from the 1974-1991 civil war are too many and that in itself is enough to appreciate that the country would not degenerate into chaos once the Syrians leave.

The various groups in Lebanon, despite their rivalry and conflicting interests, have learnt that they can end up paying heavily for any renewal of violence or bloodshed which would be conducive to foreign military intervention. It should not be overlooked that the UN team could still come up with a finding that Syria had a direct or indirect role in killing Hariri. This would definitely play into the hands of the US, whose interest is not to restore sovereignty to Lebanon now but to strike at Syria and eliminate it as a strong regional player who challenges Israel's hegemony in the Middle East.

Then, the danger that awaits Syria is that it would face US-engineered international punitive action even if it meets the UN demand for withdrawal and dismantling of the intelligence nexus between Syrian and Lebanese intelligence agencies. As such, Damascus would find itself deprived of what it considered as its best tools to be used in exactly such situations. It would not have the option of a linkage with Lebanon, with all the positive and negative elements there, in any kind of a regional equation. It would be in no position to insist on its own terms for peace with Israel and would have no option but to accept the Israeli version of peace that would have no room for the return of the Golan Heights to Syria.

It seems unlikely that Damascus will be left with any defence for itself under the current sequence of events, and that is precisely the current goal of the US and Israel.

This article was published in the Sunday, February 27, 2005 edition of the Jordan Times. It is used here with permission.