Not to derail the push for democracy

by Michael Jansen

It is interesting to see how diplomats come out of the political closet once they leave national service. Last weekend, Flynt Leverett, formerly senior director for Middle East affairs at the US National Security Council, said in a debate broadcast by the BBC that the US-sponsored roadmap for the establishment of a Palestinian state was stillborn because it was conceived as a device to win allies for the Bush administration's war on Iraq.

Leverett wrote this on good authority because he was in the room in the White House with the president and his team when the roadmap idea was conceived and he took part in its drafting. During the debate, Leverett agreed with the proposition that the "roadmap is dead". His view should be taken into account at this time because of the Arab and international drive to revive it.

A detailed plan with timetables for the creation of a viable, independent Palestinian state is needed. Yesterday, The New York Times carried an opinion article by Leverett warning the administration: "Don't rush on the road to Damascus." He began: "The assassination last month of Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister, has given new life to an old idea: using the issue of Lebanese independence to undermine Syria's strategic position."

He said that the aim of the hawks in the administration - like Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Elliott Abrams of the National Security Council - is to create a "pro-Western government in Lebanon that would accommodate Israel and help project American influence". They also see regime change in Lebanon as a means to engineer the fall of the Baathist government in Syria.

In Leverett's view this is the wrong way to go. Instead of confronting Syria, he advises Washington to work with Damascus to achieve peaceful change in both Lebanon and Syria. This is welcome advice put forward in a newspaper the administration cannot simply ignore.

Syria is prepared for change in Lebanon, but not on Washington's terms. Damascus is ready to surrender some of its assets in Lebanon, but not all.

During my recent visit to the Syrian capital, I was told by several senior officials that Syria would not insist on retaining Lebanese Prime Minister Omar Karameh, a long-time friend. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that Karameh, seeing the writing on the wall, resigned on Monday.

President Bashar Assad has also made it clear that he is ready to redeploy his 14,000 troops eastwards to the Lebanon-Syria border and, eventually, to pull them out of Lebanon altogether. But Assad is not prepared to be rushed into a precipitate withdrawal. He has put two conditions on evacuation: Lebanon should remain stable and Syria should have time to fortify its own frontier against possible attack by Israel.

These are not unreasonable demands. Assad said he would be discussing withdrawal under Security Council Resolution 1559 with UN envoy Terje Roed-Larsen when he visits Damascus this month. Previous talks were, according to Larsen, positive and there were reports in the Arabic press that a two-staged redeployment-withdrawal plan had been agreed upon. Clearly, the Lebanese anti-Syrian movement, the US, Britain and France are pushing an open door on this particular issue.

However, Syria, which has genuine, long-standing military, political and economic interests in Lebanon, also has "red lines" which, it insists, opponents should not cross. My sources in Damascus said that they should not press for the resignation of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud who, under Syrian pressure, had his term of office extended by three years last September. Damascus fears his abrupt departure would create a vacuum which would trigger a crisis and destabilise Lebanon.

Syria's opponents would also breach "red lines" should they try to abrogate the 1989 Taef accord, which ended the Lebanese civil war, and the 1991 treaty of cooperation between Lebanon and Syria.

Damascus can be expected to demand that Lebanon abide by the final paragraph of the Taef agreement which states that it should not "be allowed to become a threat to Syria's security. By allowing itself to become a passage or base for any force, state or organisation seeking to undermine its security or Syria's security". Damascus still has nightmares about Israel's 1982 occupation of Lebanon, the imposition of an Israeli-selected president, and the peace treaty Lebanon signed with Israel in 1983 and renounced in 1984 after US troops quit the country.

Syria will also insist that Lebanon retain its "Arab identity" and historic and ethnic connections with Arab countries, in accordance with Taef. Damascus does not want to see an anti-Arab, pro-US government emerge in Lebanon. This is seen as a very real danger since a majority of the members of the anti-Syria movement come from the formerly dominant Maronite Christian community and many of the leading figures in this movement are right-wing Lebanese neoconservatives, dedicated to the cause of extirpating Lebanon's "Arabism" and replacing it with "Westernism".

There is serious concern both in Damascus and Beirut about the demand of these elements for the return to the country of exiled General Michel Aoun, who seized the presidency at the end of the civil war, and the release from prison of Samir Geagea, a Maronite warlord with a particularly bloody record.

Damascus will also argue that the Taef accord should not be applied selectively. Lebanon should honour its own commitment to abolish political confessionalism which has been the basis of the system of governance since Lebanon gained independence from France. The anti-Syrian coalition would not favour this because abolition would oust the elite which has wielded political and economic power since that time.

Damascus is also likely to insist that Lebanon stick to the terms of the 1991 treaty with Syria, which provided for cooperation and coordination on a broad spectrum of political, security, cultural, scientific, agricultural and industrial, economic and financial matters. The treaty also reiterated the two countries' commitment to pursue a "common destiny" within the Arab world and created a collection of councils and committees to regulate relations between the two countries.

Moderation and time, rather than extremism and haste, are needed for the current tense situation in Lebanon not to escalate into a communal crisis. The US and its allies should heed Leverett's advice. If they do, there could be peaceful democratisation of the regimes in both Lebanon and Syria.

One must not forget that since he came to the presidency in 2000, Assad has made a protracted push for major economic and political change in his own country. By destabilising Lebanon and thereby undermining Syria's stability, the neoconservatives in Washington and Beirut could wreck the chances for democracy in both countries.

This article was published in the Thursday, March 3, 2005 edition of the Jordan Times. It is used here with permission.