Dangers of Iraqi federation

by Musa Keilani

The course of events in Iraq is following the same scenario that many Arab leaders, nationalists and writers had warned against prior to the US invasion of that country: The Shiites now want a separate Shiite federal state in central and southern Iraq.

Predictably, the demand has come from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which consists of mainly pro-Iranian Iraqi leaders who occupy senior positions in the Baghdad government.

The bare bones of the developing situation are largely simple, but bear serious consequences for the entire region.

It was always feared that without a well-prepared mechanism in place to take charge of the country, the collapse of the Saddam regime - oppressive and brutal as it was - would definitely lead to a split of the country into at least three parts: A Kurdish north, a Shiite south and a combined but hazy central Iraq.

The Saddam regime had used sheer military might as well as sops to loyalists to keep the Shiites and Kurds - as well as dissident Sunnis - in check, preventing them from advancing their quest for their own regions, eventually leading to secession. With the 1991 invasion of Kuwait, the Kurds - under America's "no-fly" zone protection and support - managed to create their autonomous region, away from the reach of Saddam's military.

Today, the Kurds have developed their "autonomous" territory into a mini-state ahead of realising their dream of establishing an independent Kurdistan at the most opportune time. They are kept in check mostly by Turkey, which has its own considerations for not allowing the creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Turkey would immediately check any more Kurdish demands to declare an independent state, and one can bet this could happen sooner rather than later. The US is caught in a dilemma here: Washington does not really seem to mind the Kurds breaking away from Iraq as long as it is on American terms. At the same time, it does not want to provoke a confrontation with Turkey whose prime minister has acknowledged the seriousness of the Kurdish problem. Notwithstanding the perceived American-Turkish bond under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation alliance, Washington is perfectly aware of the Islamist-led Turkish government's trend to turn more to its Arab Muslim neighbours as well as Iran.

Therefore, the US cannot take any action in the Turkish context without granting room for the possibility that another sweep in Turkish elections could find a fiercely anti-American regime in power in Ankara.

This is a nightmarish scenario for long-term American strategic objectives in the region.

Now the Shiites have moved onto the main stage, with their demand for secession from Iraq.

Following the 1991 war, the US deliberately held back from giving the Shiites in the south the same level of support it gave to the Kurds - notwithstanding the extension of the "no-fly" zone - because Washington feared that the southern part of the country could turn out to be an Iranian satellite state and thus move beyond American control and influence.

With the collapse of the Saddam regime in 2003, Washington nurtured hopes that it would be able to make a deal with the dominant Shiites of the south, but found itself unable to do so without the pro-Iranian SCIRI. There was nothing the US could do about it, because the group had, and continues to have, solid support among the Shiites in the south.

There are Shiite voices against the demand, including that of the prime minister himself, Ibrahim Jaafari, whose fate hangs in the balance with the Aug.15 deadline for a draft constitution. But those voices could be drowned by the din raised by other Shiite groups.

Regardless of people like Jaafari and other Shiites, the US has an additional tiger by the tail. It is unable to reject the Shiite demand outright and has to play it by ear to keep the Shiites pacified enough not to question the American military presence in Iraq. However, the Shiite leaders of Iraq also know the game and they will only step up pressure on the US.

The expected Sunni rejection of the Shiite demand completes the picture.

Indeed, one way the US could play it is to wave the Shiite demand in the face of the Sunnis and insist on an end to Sunni involvement in the insurgency and thus seek to isolate and eliminate international terrorists like Zarqawi's group.

We know that US Ambassador John Negroponte had a scenario like this in mind months ago as he desperately tried to enlist major Sunni tribes into the American camp, but the burden of the Shiites in its baggage tied down such options.

On the other hand, the Shiite demand could also be seen as the American way of waving an ace card against the Sunnis, but Washington could not hope to win there because it would find that the ace card turned into a dud while dealing with the Shiite mindset.

Groups like SCIRI and others might go along with the US to a certain extent but they are aware that they cannot take their own people for a ride too far.

Quite simply, the call for a Shiite federal state in central and southern Iraq could steer an irreversible course of development among the country's Shiite community, where senior theologians have their say, as well as some hardliners like Moqtada Sadr and others.

The Shiites have made their demand a few days ahead of a deadline for finalising the draft of a constitution for post-Saddam Iraq. While all public assertions are that the deadline will be met, there is doubt that this might not be the case and something or the other could hold up the process.

If the deadline is not met, then, under the interim constitution, the government in power should quit and dissolve the "parliament" which was elected on Jan.30 this year.

Elections will have to be held again, and the new parliament will take another shot at drafting the constitution; that is, at least in principle, the course dictated by the interim constitution.

But if new elections are held the face of political Iraq could change dramatically, and thus it is not acceptable to the incumbents in power.

A compromise would have to be found, and the Shiite demand for a separate state has only worsened the deadlock, since the issue of federalism is prominent among the disputes blocking the completion of a draft constitution.

A compromise might be possible if agreement is reached on simply excluding divisive issues from the draft, but again, the Shiites' demand for a separate state has revealed the true picture, and thus further distanced any Sunni agreement on a vague and ambiguous constitution.

The Sunnis are aware that they would cease to exist as a group and be deprived of any influence at all if the Shiites realise their objective of a Shiite state in central and southern Iraq. As many Sunni leaders have put it, it is like giving Iraq away to the Iranians.

While not ignoring the possibility that the Shiite demand is an US-engineered pressure tactic against the Sunnis, the scenario points to the most serious crisis Washington faces in post-war Iraq. By this time around the additional tiger that the US has by the tail in Iraq will be too ferocious to hang onto.

This article was published in the Sunday, August 14, 2005 edition of the Jordan Times. It is used here with permission.