A Shi'ite alliance is taking shape

by Kamran Taremi

Since 1958, Tehran-Baghdad relations have been marked by intense hostility. Even the American invasion of 2003 did not seem to change much as the first Iraqi government to assume office after the ouster of Saddam branded Iran the number one enemy of the country. Therefore, it came as a surprise when, in late July 2005, an extraordinarily large Iraqi delegation consisting of Premier Jaafari and ten of his cabinet ministers visited Tehran and signed a set of wide-ranging and unprecedented agreements covering security, energy, trade, transport, and tourism. This raised a number of serious questions about Iranian-Iraqi relations: How can we explain this new intimacy? And what benefits does Iran expect to reap?

To answer the first question it is necessary to identify the chief driver in the relationship. That in turn requires viewing Iranian-Iraqi relations in their historical context. An examination of bilateral relations reveals that ideological compatibility or the lack thereof has been the decisive factor determining the character of relations. Whenever their state ideologies have been compatible, the two regimes have had peaceful and amicable relations; conversely, when their state ideologies have clashed, enmity has ensued and conflict has defined bilateral ties. The term ideology here refers to the philosophy shaping the political elite's perception of internal threats and pattern of external alliances.

The period between 1932, when Iraq gained its independence, and 1958, when King Faisal II was overthrown, was one of ideological congruence. Authoritarian and conservative monarchies ruled both countries. Regionally, they worked together against radical Arab regimes. Internationally, both regimes were closely allied to the West. Hence, despite some territorial disputes, relations were good.

The 1958 coup in Iraq marked the beginning of ideological divergence, as the radical Arab nationalism of successive regimes in Baghdad and the Persian nationalism of the Shah clashed. Regionally, unlike Iran that maintained close ties to Israel and conservative Arab regimes, republican Iraq viewed Israel as the enemy of Arabs and sought to subvert conservative Arab states. Internationally, contrary to Iran that kept up its alliance with the West, successive Iraqi governments sided with Moscow. Hence relations deteriorated to such an extent that in the early 1970s war seemed imminent.

The victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran in February of 1979 only served to intensify the ideological differences, as Ayatollah Khomeini's fundamentalist brand of Islam came into conflict with Iraq's secular Arab nationalism, resulting in an eight-year war that left close to a million dead and injured on both sides. Despite the US invasion in 2003 and the resulting radical changes in Iraq, ideological differences between Iraq's first post-invasion government, headed by Ayad Allawi, and the Islamic regime in Tehran remained as intense as before.

However, the National Assembly elections held on January 31, 2005 produced a sea change in Baghdad. The winning coalition of Shi'ite groups, consisting chiefly of the Islamic Dawa Party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), had very close ideological, political and military ties with the Islamic regime in Iran, which for close to a quarter of a century had provided them with a base to fight Saddam's regime. A chief consequence of this ideological affinity was the wide-ranging agreements that the two sides signed in Tehran last month. These agreements herald something far more important, i.e., the emergence in the Middle East of a new alliance between Tehran and Baghdad.

From Tehran's perspective, such an alliance presents a myriad of benefits. To start with, it could restore security to Iran's western borders, allowing Tehran to concentrate its military resources in the south where a US invasion is likely to be launched. Further, it would deal a serious blow to the US strategy of containing Iran. It would also place Iran in a stronger position in bargaining with the US and the EU over a wide variety of issues, including Iran's nuclear program. Similarly, it would tilt the balance of power in the Persian Gulf in favor of Iran as it unites the Gulf's two strongest powers against Saudi Arabia and its partners in the GCC.

Such an alliance would also help improve the position of Shi'ites in Sunni-dominated Arab countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, allowing them to press more effectively for their political rights. As in Iraq, any rise in the power of the Shi'ite community in other Persian Gulf states would translate into greater power and influence for Iran.

Moreover, a friendly Iraq would allow Iran to have a direct land link with Syria, its major regional ally, rather than sea and air links that are more susceptible to disruption at times of crisis. Iranian leaders believe that a friendly Iraq could join Iran, Syria and Lebanon in an alliance against Israel, thereby enhancing the overall position of Iran's Arab partners vis-a-vis Israel.

At the same time, Iraq would also provide Iran with an excellent entry point to penetrate the Arab world. Iran has so far relied on Syria and Lebanon for entry into the Arab scene and influencing Arab politics, but these links have always been at the mercy of the Baath regime in Syria. Iran very much prefers to have direct links that are neither dependent on Assad's regime nor constrained by Syrian interests.

To sum up, for as long as Shi'ites play a dominant role in Iraqi politics, one should expect the nascent Iran-Iraq alliance to survive. Being fully aware of the immense value of this alliance, Iranian authorities will do what they can to assist the Jafari government and will make every effort to ensure that Shi'ites get a share of power commensurate with their majority status in Iraq.

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- Published 11/8/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org Used here with permission.

Kamran Taremi is a lecturer in the department of political science, University of Tehran.