A long and complex history

by Saad Jawad

With a Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government and security forces, it is tempting to think that Iran's influence in Iraq is higher then it has ever been, and that Iranian-backed elements will continue to dominate Iraqi politics for the next long while.

But even a brief glance at the very long and complicated history between the two countries should make it clear that nothing so straightforward is likely to happen.

From the invasion of Persia by the Muslim armies from Iraq through the Ottoman and Safawid empires' struggle for regional pre-eminence, what is now Iraq and Iran have alternated between periods of deep enmity and close friendship. The centrality of Najaf and Kerbala to Shi'ite faith and custom, and the large Shi'ite but Arab community in Iraq, will always ensure that the two countries' destinies are inextricably linked.

So it has proved in modern times, since the British domination in the early twentieth century, which led to the signing of the 1937 treaty that laid the ground for peace then but also the seeds of conflict in the future. The Shatt al-Arab waterway was given to Iraq, over the heads of Iran, while a steady and continuous influx of Iranians to the Shi'ite holy cities of Najaf and Kerbala was a source of constant irritation to Iraq.

The monarchies in the 1940s and 50s kept a lid on these tensions. After the 1958 revolution in Iraq that ushered in the republic, however, they came out in the open. Fearing the spread of Arab nationalism and communism, Iran began encouraging dissenters in Iraq, notably the discontented Kurdish minority. This came to a head in 1961, when Kurdish rebels declared independence.

The Kurdish rebellion failed to obtain self-rule, but succeeded in weakening the Iraqi regime enough that its fate was sealed. And with, first, the Arab Nationalist officers gaining power in 1963 and, in 1968, the Iraq Baath party, Iran's geo-strategic aim of securing dominance in the region was seriously compromised.

In 1969, Iran declared the 1937 treaty null and void. On the ground, it intensified its support for the Kurds and secret Shi'ite parties such as Al Dawa. To counter the influence of its powerful enemy in the east, the Baath party, already struggling with an increasingly disenfranchised Kurdish minority, decided to expel Iraqi families of Iranian origin and confiscate their properties and lands. This was a policy that started before the Iran-Iraq war, but continued during and after. Beyond the humanitarian consequences, the policy was a failure strategically, succeeding only in creating a large Iranian--Iraqi community in Iran that the latter organized and trained.

And while the Algiers treaty of 1975 brought a dramatic change in relations between the two countries, with an agreement to share the Shatt al-Arab waterway and end the war in Kurdistan, it was a short-lived respite, and issues such as the expelled Iraqis in Iran were never solved.

In 1980, one year after the Iranian revolution, partly out of fear of the "export the revolution" motto and partly because Baghdad saw the timing as propitious, Iraq declared war on Iran. Both sides thought they had good reason to expect victory. Baghdad saw a weakened Iran, still in turmoil after the revolution, while Tehran felt certain that Iraq could not conduct a successful war while ruling over a majority and discontented Shi'ite community.

Over eight years the two countries fought each other to a bloody standstill, with enormous human, economic and military losses on both sides. Iraq nevertheless emerged with a huge and modern army that had been sponsored by the West. That, in turn, prepared the ground for the 2003 occupation.

From the outset, it was obvious that the US-led occupation had no clear agenda for how to rule Iraq. In its infancy, the occupation led to widespread looting and rampaging, against which the occupation forces stood by either helpless or disinterested. A huge mistake was then made when the army, police and other security forces were disbanded without replacements ready. Borders were left untended.

But perhaps most importantly, rather than focus on Iraq, the US started threatening Iraq's neighbors, Syria and Iran. It was only natural then that these two states, and especially Iran, would move to make live as difficult as possible for the US. And with well-trained and well-positioned elements for exactly that purpose already in place it was not difficult for Iran.

Iranian infiltration and influence was very clear in Iraq immediately after the invasion. The Shi'ite Badr Corps appointed itself as the security apparatus of the state, and in the absence of any official Iraqi forces, it was. Other militias belonging to other political parties also had a free hand in occupied Iraq. The position of these organizations was strengthened by the appointment of their leaders to the US-backed Governing Council. The feeling among the vast majority of the Shi'ite community was one of disgust with the old regime and an eagerness to rule after a long period of neglect by the old Sunni ruling class. Pro-Iran Shi'ite leaders and organizations encouraged these sentiments and promised Shi'ites the initiative.

All these factors explain the victory in the last elections by the Shi'ite-dominated list. Despite all American attempts to block the assumption of power of a religious Shi'ite personality, that is exactly what happened. Iran was victorious for a while with the enormous influence it could exercise inside the new government.

But this influence is still facing Iraqi and US opposition. The Shi'ite-dominated government is losing a lot of its support because of its failure to solve day-to-day problems. The intensity of the Iraqi resistance, militant or civil, to the occupation, will also prove a big obstacle in the way of ever-increasing Iranian influence in Iraq. It must always be remembered that while co-religionists, Iraq's Shi'ites are also Arab, and closer culturally to their Sunni neighbors.

Iran always had and always will have influence in Iraq. Vice-versa, what happens in Iraq has important consequences in Iran. Ultimately any Iraqi government, of whatever color, that can assure stability in Iraq and peaceful relations with Iran is in the interests of both countries. Iran does not want to overextend itself in Iraq for fear of burning its fingers, and its interests in Iraq will decrease if and when it is convinced that Iraq poses no threat.

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- Published 11/8/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org Used here with permission.

Saad Jawad is professor of political science at Baghdad University.