Kurdistan will be virtually independent

by Peter W. Galbraith

from: Bitter Lemons (used w/permission)

The year 2003 turned out to be very good for Iraq's Kurds. As the year started, the Kurdistan region of Iraq was entering its twelfth year of de facto independence, thanks to the peshmerga (the Kurdish military), and the US-British no-fly zone. For many Kurds, these 12 years were a golden era. For the first time in their history, the Kurds governed themselves, having elected a Kurdistan Assembly and government in 1992.

In spite of later splitting into two Kurdistan Regional Governments--one in Irbil headed by Massoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and one in Sulaimani headed by Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)--the Kurdistan administrations have had real accomplishments. In 12 years they tripled the number of schools in the region, opened two new universities, and helped rebuild some 4,000 villages destroyed by Saddam Hussein's forces in the 1980s. Kurdish culture and identity flourished, and a generation grew up with no sense of being Iraqi.

In early 2003, the looming war between the United States and Iraq threatened to undo much of what the Kurds had achieved, including their self-government. With Kurdistan's three largest cities, Irbil, Sulaimani and Dihok all within artillery range of Iraqi positions, many Kurds feared both conventional and chemical attacks. As war approached, cities emptied.

Politically, the Kurds feared being sacrificed in a bigger strategic calculation. In February, the Bush administration promised Turkey it could send thousands of troops to Iraqi Kurdistan, in exchange for access by the US Fourth Infantry Division to northern Iraq through Turkey. Barzani and Talabani protested vehemently, but to no effect. Both men feared that Kurdistan's independence would become the price of getting Turkish troops out.

Finally, the Kurdish leaders knew that the Pentagon civilians harbored ambitious plans for remaking Iraq as a unified democratic Arab state that might reshape the entire Middle East. Within this grand plan of nation building, there was little place for a self-governing Kurdistan.

Perhaps for the first time in their history, the Kurds were lucky. The Turkish parliament narrowly voted against allowing US troops to cross its territory, and it did so in a manner that maximized American anger at Turkey. The Kurdish peshmerga took over the role intended for the Fourth Infantry Division, creating a northern front in cooperation with a small number of US Special Forces. The Kurds, who sustained more casualties than any other US ally, consolidated their unique status as America's best friend among the peoples of Iraq. They also took control of Kirkuk, and virtually all other historically Kurdish territory in Iraq, while carting an ample supply of Iraqi heavy weapons into the mountains.

American plans for the rapid reintegration of Kurdistan into a new Iraq quickly foundered as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) struggled to establish itself, and as the US administration dealt with the consequences of having failed to plan for the day after. The peshmerga were quietly exempted from the general order to disarm Iraqi militia. After asking the Kurds to dismantle the checkpoints between their territory and the rest of Iraq, the CPA asked them to re-establish the border in the interests of security.

The creation of an Iraqi Governing Council enabled the Kurds to consolidate their special status. Five of the 25 council members are Kurds, and Barzani and Talabani are its most powerful members, having an unambiguous political and electoral base. They have used their power well, securing recognition of Kurdistan's separate status in the way Iraq is governed. Laws passed by the Iraqi Governing Council in Baghdad do not apply in Kurdistan unless specifically approved by the Kurdistan Assembly. To date, only a handful of such laws have been applied in Kurdistan. Thus, Kurdistan has its own legal system, its own investment code, and a tax regime separate from Iraq's, with different rates from those in the rest of the country. Iraqi ministers do not exercise authority in Kurdistan, but instead work with the ministries of the respective Kurdistan regional governments.

Not all of this sits well with the American occupation authorities, who would like to bring the Kurdistan region more under the control of the central government. With just 200 US troops in Kurdistan (which remains the only reliably pro-American part of the country), the CPA has almost no power to make this happen. And, with so much going wrong elsewhere in Iraq, no one wants to create a new trouble spot. More importantly, the Kurds know full well that they can outlast Ambassador Bremer and his administration, whose termination date is less than 200 days away.

By the end of 2003, Kurdistan's leaders can see their way clear to getting what they want. This includes not only the continuation of their institutions of self-government, but also clear recognition of the supremacy of Kurdistan's laws within Kurdistan, as well as acceptance of Kurdistan's right to defend itself (for 70 years, the Iraqi army has been the only enemy most Kurds have ever known, and few believe one year of American-directed reforms has transformed that institution).

Almost all Iraqi Arab political leaders now endorse federalism, and many accept that Kurdistan will be virtually independent. Most important, Iraq's Kurds are increasingly confident of their own power. They can live with the status quo and know no constitution can be applied to them without their consent.

At the end of the year, Kurds celebrated gleefully as Saddam Hussein, the man responsible for the deaths of more than 300,000 of their number, was captured and revealed as a coward. For a people long the doormat of the Middle East, life does not get much better.

-Published 18/12/2003