Continuity

by Meliha Benli Altunisik

Recently there has been a debate both inside and outside Turkey as to whether its Middle East policy is changing, and if so in what direction. Turkey is developing its ties with Syria, its foe for the last two decades, while its relations with its strategic ally Israel seem to be souring amidst the Turkish prime minister's criticisms of Israeli government policies toward the Palestinians. Turkey has also been intensifying its security cooperation with Iran, another country that it frequently accused of supporting the separatist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) in the 1990s.

All these developments have led some to argue that Turkey's Middle East policy is changing, and that this is largely due to the ascent to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has roots in Turkey's traditional Islamist political movement. I would argue that both of these factors are inadequate to explain what is happening; the main tenet of Turkey's policy toward the region remains the same.

The Kurdish issue has been the key to understanding Turkey's Middle East policy since the Gulf war of 1991. The war with the separatist PKK intensified largely as a result of developments in northern Iraq and due to direct and indirect support provided to the PKK by Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors. In response, a traditional power politics approach dominated Turkey's relations with the region. The "referent object" of security became Turkey's territorial integrity. Ankara redefined its strategy and identified the Middle East as the number one source of threat to Turkey.

This portrayal of the issue as an existential threat called for extraordinary measures beyond traditional policy means, especially with Syria. Syrian support for the PKK culminated in a crisis in October 1998. Turkey's sense of increasing vulnerability and insecurity led to the forging of security relations with Israel.

As to Iraq, Turkey adopted a multifaceted policy. On the one hand it tried to end the PKK presence there through the use of military force. During those years the Turkish armed forces staged regular incursions into northern Iraq. Eventually Turkey even established a permanent special forces presence there in the mid-1990s. Turkey also cultivated relations with the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, both to enlist their support against the PKK and to have leverage over developments there. Turkey provided diplomatic passports to Iraqi Kurdish leaders Mustafa Barazani and Jalal Talabani and became their link to the outside world. In addition to allowing border trade, Ankara even provided economic aid to them. Most importantly, however, by allowing United States and United Kingdom forces to use Incirlik airbase, Turkey enabled the continuation of the north's de facto independence from Baghdad. Finally, Turkey hoped to increase its cards in future developments in Iraq by actively supporting the cause of the Turkomans there.

Similar concerns continue to drive Turkey's foreign policy toward the region and affect its relations there in the aftermath of the Iraq war of 2003. The potential for disintegration of Iraq, and particularly but not solely the emergence of an irredentist Kurdish state, is considered a major threat to Turkey. Turkey's policy is thus geared toward preventing this development, including a change in the status of oil-rich, multi-ethnic Kirkuk in the new political landscape of Iraq.

As it did in the 1990s, Turkey today to a large extent judges its bilateral relations through the Iraq issue. The difference is that unlike its posture in the 1990s, Turkey now finds Iran and Syria cooperative, as these two countries feel pressure coming largely from the United States and are similarly concerned about the establishment of a Kurdish state.

When it comes to Israel, the relationship is strained. The two countries shared a similar strategic vision of the region and thus cooperated in the 1990s, although even then it was clear that their interests differed to a large extent in Iraq. The tension in this matrix became more apparent after the Iraq war. Turkey became more concerned about reported Israeli activities, particularly in northern Iraq, and became suspicious of Israeli support for the establishment of a Kurdish state there.

There are of course other factors that affect the overall policy and/or position of particular foreign policy actors. These may include: domestic policy concerns of the AKP, genuine interest and concern about the Palestinians, Turkey's interest in emerging as a soft power in the region and particularly as a model for political and economic transformation in the Middle East, and the effects of harmonization with the EU--not necessarily in this order. Yet the crux of the policy is Iraq, as it has been since the Gulf war of 1991. Once again Ankara seems to be judging its bilateral relations and defining its interests through this lens.

-Published 22/7/2004