War & Terrorism

CAP Senior Fellow Lawrence Korb testifies before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management: Read this testimony (CAP Action)

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished members of the subcommittees, thank you for inviting me to testify about the Iranian government’s alleged plans to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States on American soil. This event comes at a critical time in U.S.-Iranian relations, and it is imperative that the United States not overreact but respond rationally and effectively. In this testimony, I will discuss how the United States can best respond to Iran in order to protect and defend our national security and our interests in the Middle East and across the globe in this age of terrorism, tyrants, and weapons of mass destruction.

First, I would begin by congratulating our agents at the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration. This case is a victory for law enforcement and a testament to the hard work done every day by the men and women at these two agencies to keep our country safe from terrorists with a global reach.

As you all know, in recent years, Iran has repeatedly worked against the interests of the United States and the international community. In addition to this most recent plot—Iran’s boldest but also most poorly executed effort to harm the United States and its allies—Iran is a known sponsor of terrorism and has pursued an illicit nuclear program in defiance of the international community. For example, just last spring, the Treasury Department announced it had uncovered evidence that Iran was funneling money and recruits to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Additionally, Iran’s decision to enrich uranium to 20 percent—far more than the 3.5 percent necessary to produce nuclear energy—as well as its decision to store this fuel in an underground bunker suggests that its nuclear program is not designed solely for peaceful purposes. In short, the planned assassination of the Saudi ambassador is merely the latest example of hostile behavior by Iran.

The question now facing the United States is how best to respond. Over the past two weeks, it has been gratifying to hear warnings from both sides of the aisle about the perils of reckless military action. Political leaders from Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, to Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT), chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, have urged restraint.

In the past, unthinking military action by the United States has strengthened Iran’s hand. Iran is perhaps the clearest winner from our mindless, needless, senseless invasion and occupation of Iraq. The war allowed Iran to capitalize on the overwhelming anti-American sentiment generated throughout the Arab and Muslim world by our invasion of Iraq under false pretenses.

CAP Senior Fellow Lawrence Korb testifies before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management: Read this testimony (CAP Action)

Lawrence J. Korb is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress.

The killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born terrorist working with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, is a victory in the fight against international terrorist groups targeting the United States. Much remains unclear about how Awlaki was killed but it looks like a U.S. airstrike from a jet or drone aircraft. Based on Awlaki’s direct connection to terrorists that attacked the United States, he falls under the scope of the law Congress passed governing the military fight against international terrorism. That makes him a legitimate military target.

The significance of his death for AQAP or on Yemen-based terrorism, however, should not be overstated. It’s true that Awlaki was among the most influential international terrorists adept at spreading the movement using English. But he was not even the most powerful figure in his own terrorist group let alone a potential successor to the leadership role of Osama bin Laden. And his death will have virtually no impact on the AQAP’s strength in Yemen.

So while this is a clear win for the U.S.-led air campaign against AQAP, that’s the most Awlaki’s death can accomplish. And it is woefully inadequate to address the medium- and long-term challenges of AQAP in the region or the multiple ongoing crises facing the Yemeni people.

The story on Anwar al-Awlaki is as follows. He was born in New Mexico and was a U.S. citizen. But he spent much of his early life in Yemen. By 2000 Awlaki had returned to the United States and was an imam at a San Diego mosque visited by 9/11 hijackers Nawaf a Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar. When Hazmi moved across the country to Washington, D.C., in 2001 as the attacks approached, he and another 9/11 hijacker, Hani Hanjour, again connected with Awlaki—this time at a mosque in Falls Church, Virginia.

The 9/11 Commission Report documents the FBI’s suspicion that Awlaki was a facilitator for the hijackers: “[S]ome FBI investigators doubt [Eyad al] Rababah’s story. Some agents suspect that Aulaqi (Awlaki) may have tasked Rababah to help Hamzi and Hanjour. We share that suspicion, given the remarkable coincidence of Aulaqi’s prior relationship with Hazmi.”

Awlaki subsequently fled the United States and returned to Yemen, where he began inspiring would-be terrorists in the West to attack the United States or other Western targets. He was in email communication with Maj. Nadal Hassan, the perpetrator of the Ft. Hood shootings that killed 13 Americans. He is also directly connected to Omar Farouk Abdulmuttalab and the failed Christmas Day attempt to destroy a Detroit-bound airplane by AQAP. And he reportedly inspired Faisal al-Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber. AQAP launched another failed attack using explosives hidden in toner cartridges bound for the U.S. aboard freight aircraft.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Congress enacted the Authorization to Use Military Force, which gave the president the power:

... to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

From what we now know about his subsequent actions, it strains credulity to believe that Awlaki’s connection to those three 9/11 hijackers while they were in the United States was merely coincidental. Awlaki has clearly been involved in attacks on the United States since 9/11 and continuously threatens to do so in the future.

The airstrike targeting Awlaki was not an extrajudicial execution for his role in the 9/11 attacks. It was an airstrike that resulted in the death of a legitimate military target based on the power Congress granted the president in the 2001 AUMF. There are reasonable questions raised about the interpretation of the 2001 AUMF when targeting or detaining suspected terrorists. But this instance does not happen to be one of them.

The killing of Awlaki, and the possibility that another American, Samir Khan, was also killed in the same strike, is a genuine victory. Khan is believed to be the creator of the online English-language magazine Inspire and was a key figure in the media and propaganda efforts of international terrorists. The loss of Awlaki and Khan together represents a major setback for international terrorism’s inspirational and propaganda activities using English in the West.

Still, we shouldn’t get as carried away as Rep. Peter King (R-NY) does when he claims that “[i]n many ways, Awlaki was, operationally, more important than Bin Laden. “

That’s ridiculous. Awlaki was able to reach an audience and inspire would-be terrorists in the West because he often delivered video sermons or writings in English. But he was no bin Laden. In fact, U.S. officials unintentionally served as Awlaki’s biggest propaganda office by constantly inflating his importance within AQAP and international terrorism.

Princeton University Yemen expert Gregory Johnsen wrote today of Awlaki’s death that “Nasir al-Wihayshi, Said al-Shihri, Qasim al-Raymi and so on are much more important to the continued existence of AQAP than was Awlaki. I don’t think Awlaki’s death will in any way be debilitating for the organization.”

Further, the use of airstrikes against terrorists in Yemen and elsewhere are a useful counterterrorism tool but they are not sufficient to defeat terrorism on their own and fall far short of the necessary action in Yemen. The United States has reportedly increased its use of airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen since the political crisis gripping that fractured country has diverted the attention of Yemen’s security forces to regime survival. But at best this is a temporary solution. At worst it could exacerbate the problem of AQAP in Yemen if U.S. officials are further seduced by the transitory success of airstrikes.

What’s more, activities such as airstrikes in Yemen at the exclusion of virtually any other American footprint only further convince the Yemeni people that our only objective is to protect U.S. interests at the expense of issues that legitimately rank much higher on their priority list than targeting AQAP.

The death of Anwar al-Awlaki does remove a terrorist intent on directing attacks on the United States who could inspire a new audience in the West to take up his call because he could speak and write in English. But while he may be among the most identifiable international terrorists, he was not even the most powerful figure in his own terrorist group. Meanwhile, AQAP will certainly remain a major threat to Yemen, its neighbors in the region, and the United States. U.S. airstrikes in Yemen weaken AQAP, but only a broader approach to Yemen that addresses the problems that more directly affect the everyday lives of Yemenis will help that country achieve a more stable and sustainable future.

Ken Gude is the Managing Director of the National Security and International Policy Program at American Progress.

See also:

• Whack-a-Mole in Yemen by Ken Gude and Ken Sofer
• The Last Best Chance to Save Yemen by Ken Gude and Ken Sofer

Once again this morning The Washington Post lends its op-ed space to the neverending conservative campaign to weaken U.S. counterterrorism policy.

This time Sens. Joe Lieberman (I-CT) and Kelly Ayotte (R-NH) complain that the Obama administration sent a suspected member of the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab to a New York federal court for trial instead of military detention in Guantanamo Bay. The U.S. criminal justice system boasts a long and successful record of prosecuting terrorism cases and obtaining valuable intelligence information. Guantanamo, however, remains a terrorist-recruiting bonanza. Sending an al-Shabaab member there is a terrible idea that would elevate the stature of the terrorist group and draw it more into direct conflict with the United States.

The circumstances of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame’s detention are certainly sensational. He was seized somewhere at sea between Somalia and Yemen and held aboard a U.S. Navy ship for at least two months while being interrogated by the High-Value Interrogation Group, or HIG, the team drawn from numerous frontline U.S. government agencies established by the Obama administration specifically to question suspected high-ranking terrorists. It was then determined after extensive discussions among top Obama administration national security officials to transfer Warsame to New York for trial on material support for terrorism and conspiracy charges.

This last move is what created the political opportunity for President Obama’s opponents to go on the attack despite the fact that this case is very similar to that of the 2008 arrest of Afiaa Siddique. Siddique was captured in Afghanistan and accused of the attempted murder of U.S. military personnel. The Bush administration quickly transferred her to the United States for trial in a federal court, where she was convicted and sentenced to 86 years in prison.

Conservatives didn’t say anything about Siddique’s transfer to the United States for trial, but 23 senators sent a letter to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stoking unfounded fears that Warsame would be released in the United States. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) took to the Senate floor to accuse President Obama of “deliberately importing a terrorist into the United States.” And today, Sens. Liberman and Ayotte claim “there is no good reason” not to use Guantanamo for the detention and prosecution of Warsame thus avoiding “the risks associated with a terrorism trial in a U.S. city.”

Well, senators, I have a few reasons. And they’re based on facts—not on attempts to scare the American people for political gain.

Criminal courts are much more experienced in prosecuting terrorists. Far from the supposed “advantages” Sens. Lieberman and Ayotte claim for military commissions, criminal courts are significantly better suited to prosecuting suspected terrorists on these charges than the Guantanamo military commissions. U.S. federal courts have extensive experience in handling cases involving charges of material support for terrorism and conspiracy, literally having prosecuted dozens if not hundreds of such cases whereas similar military commissions cases can be counted on one hand.

Criminal courts produce longer sentences. Looking at the results of these cases also demonstrates the criminal courts’ superiority as two of the three individuals convicted on material support charges in military commissions have already been set free while criminal courts dole out much longer sentences of at least 15 years. The prime example of this was the case of Salim Hamdan, who was acquitted by a military commission of conspiracy but convicted of material support for terrorism for serving as Osama bin Laden’s driver. His sentence was five months, and he was returned home to Yemen by the Bush administration.

Warsame’s conviction in a military commission could be overturned on appeal. Prosecuting Warsame for material support for terrorism and conspiracy charges in military commissions also runs the unnecessary risk that any conviction will be overturned on appeal for reasons unrelated to his alleged actions. Military commissions are established to prosecute war crimes, and neither material support nor conspiracy has ever been considered a war crime subject to prosecution in a military tribunal. That creates the very real prospect that any such conviction would be overturned on appeal. Why take that risk when a perfectly good and tested alternative exists?

Criminal courts yield reliable intelligence. Sens. Liberman and Ayotte next urge the detention of suspected terrorists like Warsame to be based on “intelligence gathering,” but completely ignore the evidence that the criminal justice system is an excellent source of reliable intelligence and military detention has a spotty record at best. Leaving aside that Warsame was interrogated for weeks by the HIG, he is reportedly still cooperating with federal authorities while his criminal case advances. Warsame is cooperating just like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the failed underwear bomber; Bryant Vinas, the American captured in Pakistan who has provided a “treasure trove” of information; and David Headley, who gave up information that rolled up terrorist cells and won convictions. The list goes on.

Intelligence collection from military detention is spotty. Sens. Lieberman and Ayotte claim that military detention is superior for intelligence collection because suspected terrorists “can be interrogated for as long as necessary in order to gain intelligence.” That would be great if the duration of interrogation was connected in any way to results. But unfortunately the evidence does not bear this out. The Bush administration detained Jose Padilla in military custody for more than five years, but he never provided any useful or reliable information to his interrogators. The same is true for Ali al-Mari, who was also held by the Bush administration for years in military custody and never cooperated.

Detaining Warsame at Guantanamo would help terrorists win more recruits. Conditions at Guantanamo have significantly improved since the darkest days of the Bush administration. But it is equally true that the detention center remains a symbol of the worst excesses of the Bush administration’s war on terrorism, and a potent propaganda and recruitment weapon for America’s terrorist enemies. Sending a member of al-Shabaab to Guantanamo—treating him as a warrior rather than a criminal—would hand the Somali-based terrorist group a major opening to elevate its standing among international terrorist groups vying for prominence in the wake of Osama bin Laden’s death. It would also boost their recruiting, an effort which already occurs among Somali communities in the United States.

Sending Warsame to Guantanamo could draw al-Shabaab into targeting the United States. Al-Shabaab’s recruiting pitches and activities have largely focused on drawing young Somalis back to their homeland to fight for control of the country and not on conducting terrorist attacks on the United States or other targets. It does now appear, however, as if al-Shabaab is expanding its focus beyond Somalia’s borders. Sending a member of al-Shabaab to a place as loaded with symbolic power as Guantanamo could actually provide fresh impetus for them to direct more resources toward attacking U. S. targets with a pre-existing stable of Somali-American recruits.

Criminal courts have a long and successful record of handling terrorism cases like Warsame’s. They produce reliable intelligence information and deliver long jail sentences while military commissions are virtually untested, certainly unreliable, often allow for the quick release of those convicted, and have not demonstrated much in the way of producing intelligence.

Sens. Lieberman and Ayotte want the Obama administration to reject a criminal justice system that works in favor of a military detention system that would boost terrorist recruiting and might even draw al-Shabaab into expanding its operations to include U.S. targets. The Obama administration is right not to listen to them.

Ken Gude is Managing Director of the National Security and International Policy Program at American Progress.

See also:

• Conservatives Outraged over Prosecution of Terror Suspect by Ken Gude

White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan announced a new effort on Wednesday to give the United States a surgeon’s precision in the fight against terrorism by focusing more directly on Al Qaeda. The new National Strategy for Counterterrorism, when coupled with President Barack Obama’s Afghanistan drawdown speech last week, represents the end of the era of resource-intensive counterinsurgency strategy as a means to fight terrorism. The new counterterrorism strategy aims to address the evolving threat of a decentralized Al Qaeda through smaller, discreet operations, and recognizes the need to provide nonmilitary assistance to civilians in the most vulnerable areas exploited by terrorists. We applaud this new approach as a step in the right direction but recognize it comes with new dangers.

Counterinsurgency has proven costly and ineffective in battling terrorists. A new study finds that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will ultimately cost between $3.2 trillion and $4 trillion at a time when Congress is looking to slash vital domestic programs. Worse, the human costs of the wars exceed 6,000 U.S. soldiers killed and 40,000 wounded both physically and mentally. The number of civilians killed in Iraq and Afghanistan as a result of the war is, by “very conservative estimates,” over 132,000.

These expensive endeavors actually played into Osama bin Laden’s strategy of “bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.” In contrast, the mission that killed bin Laden was undertaken by a mere two dozen soldiers at a tiny fraction of the price.

Al Qaeda and its allied terrorist groups have adapted their tactics since their ouster from Afghanistan. They are using a less centralized network of smaller regional affiliates to carry the terrorist cause across the globe. This international Al-Qaeda-inspired network has groups based in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and Algeria with smaller cells across the Middle East, North Africa, and South and Southeast Asia.

Resource-intensive counterinsurgency operations are a poor match for such a diffuse array of terrorist groups. Some possess the capability to attack the United States and others perhaps only the intent. The administration’s new counterterrorism strategy recognizes this new reality.

But just as massive ground invasions produced serious blowback, we cannot ignore the potential for similar reactions to elements of this new strategy. The greater reliance on more surgical strikes, for example, has become synonymous with unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones. According to U.S. officials, the drone campaign in Pakistan has yielded significant tactical advantages in eliminating terrorist leaders and generally putting terrorist groups under great stress. What is equally true, however, is that the drones are extremely unpopular with local populations and can be a driver of recruitment into terrorist or extremist groups. In fact, Faisal Shazaad reportedly claimed he was motivated to try to detonate a bomb in Times Square last May because of the U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan.

This is why reports that the United States is now increasing the use of drones in Yemen and Somalia give us pause. It’s not that drones are ineffective or shouldn’t be used, but merely that it would be a mistake to allow the only U.S. footprint in those areas to be drones. This essentially replaces ground invasion with death from above.

The rebalancing possible under a strategy that rejects counterinsurgency should free up some resources to invest in the progress of these at-risk countries. The United States can meaningfully improve security for people in Yemen with a few million dollars of investment and be much more effective than a trillion-dollar invasion and counterinsurgency operation in a country like Iraq.

The point is that there are military and nonmilitary means to combat terrorism that do not involve such a large presence of U.S. soldiers and are much more effective than massive ground invasions. By reducing our large military presence and replacing it with a more deliberate, targeted strategy, we can cut off the oxygen that fuels terrorist groups. In such a delicate time in the Middle East, we have the opportunity to alter our efforts in the most vulnerable areas of the world, turn the tide against anti-American sentiment, and redefine our role in the region. Further, our renewed and expanded nonmilitary efforts can help secure civilian populations and develop regional networks to combat terrorism wherever it appears.

We must be vigilant but pragmatic against the dynamic terrorist threat. The strategic shift away from massive military operations represents a good first step.

Ken Gude is the Managing Director for National Security, Ken Sofer is the Special Assistant, and Aaron Gurley is an intern at American Progress.

It goes without saying that the end of the terrorist mass murderer Osama bin Laden does not mean the end of the terrorist threat against the United States. Nor does it end the debate over the nature of that threat and the best methods of defeating it. But hopefully the death of America’s most notorious enemy—and an easing of the fears of millions that were bound up with him—will provide us an opportunity to think more rigorously about what it is he represented and what that means for the United States’ future relationships with the Arab publics to whom Osama bin Laden pitched his appeal.

The New York Times’s Anthony Shadid and David Kirkpatrick reported Tuesday that bin Laden’s legacy in the Arab world is not a simple one. The overwhelming majority in that region rejected his ultraconservative ideology as well as his reprehensible terrorist methods. But there was and still remains some measure of admiration for the man who defiantly declared war on the regimes that have oppressed Arabs for decades and on the Great Power patron who facilitated that oppression.

One of the great ironies of U.S. policy after the September 11 attacks was that President George W. Bush seemed to grasp that bin Laden’s appeal, though cynical, was rooted in real grievances against longstanding U.S. support for undemocratic regimes and that this regional status quo was unsustainable.

“Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe,” President Bush said in a 2003 speech at the National Endowment for Democracy. “As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export.”

And yet having diagnosed the problem, his administration’s bizarre prescription—invading and occupying Iraq as a way to kick-start regional change—directly resulted in its having to abandon its democracy agenda and double down on support for those same dictators, pleading with them to help stem the extremist tide that the Iraq debacle unleashed.

In other words, President Bush voiced support for regional democrats and then withdrew it and scuttled back behind the usual Arab authoritarian enforcers. In so doing, he helped bring the United States’ reputation in the Middle East to a historic low point. America’s power and ability to shape events in the region was significantly diminished.

Fortunately, Al Qaeda’s own strategic stupidity prevented the organization from profiting too much from this. Its staggering brutality in Iraq and other countries such as Jordan—where a massive hotel bombing in 2005 resulted in anti-Al Qaeda demonstrations—managed to alienate rather than embolden and inspire new recruits (though of course many of those who did join up to fight in Iraq have returned to their respective countries to carry on the fight).

It would be a mistake to interpret Al Qaeda’s failure in this respect as a U.S. policy success. We’ve seen spectacularly over the past few months that the grievances to which bin Laden appealed are still present in the Middle East. The difference is that they’ve been expressed in a far more admirable and inspiring way, by those who’ve demonstrated in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, and elsewhere.

But the truth is the U.S. foreign policy community hasn’t been able to squarely consider what made bin Laden’s propaganda resonate as much as it did and what a radical shift this might require for U.S. policy in the region. The Arab Spring of revolutions—or what I desperately hope will be an Arab Spring—makes it more imperative than ever that we do so.

What bin Laden got right is the strong perception among Muslims that the United States’ relationship with the Muslim Middle East has not been very good for most Muslims in the Middle East. To say that relationship has been built upon security imperatives is facile. All relationships between states are built upon security to a great extent.

More specifically, this relationship has been built on a shortsighted and long-outdated vision of security in which the primary point of American engagement was its military who buttressed authoritarian leaders who promised to keep their people quiet and the oil flowing. The people of the Middle East have now resoundingly rejected this deal. (And they have also, thankfully, stridently rejected bin Ladenism.) The United States must as well.

There’s now a dangerous idea in certain D.C. circles that if we help the people of the Middle East have true democracy, they’ll choose governments and policies the United States likes. This is simply not true. These governments will not act as America’s willing enforcers any more if and when they come to truly reflect popular will.

For instance, the current Egyptian government may not yet be fully democratic. But it’s clearly more democratic than the previous one in the sense that it is more responsive to popular will, which is strongly supportive of the Palestinians. This responsiveness is part of what led it to violate clearly marked U.S. red lines and broker a unity agreement between Fatah and Hamas. This is what the democratic future of the Middle East will look like.

The bottom line is this: While Americans may see our efforts in Muslim lands through the lens of freedom bringing, many if not most of the people there don’t see it that way. Recognizing that fact is essential because soon—hopefully—these people will be voting, probably for leaders and policies Americans won’t always be pleased with.

This doesn’t mean the United States should withdraw from engagement in these lands—quite the opposite. We need to broaden and deepen that engagement beyond the point of a gun to develop America’s relationship with the people of the Middle East and not just with its regimes.

Matthew Duss is a Policy Analyst and Director of Middle East Progress at American Progress.

See also:

• Another Way to Fight Terrorism by Sarah Margon
• After bin Laden by Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman
• The bin Laden Aftermath by Brian Katulis
• A Chance for America and Pakistan to Enhance Coordination to Fight Common Threats by Peter Juul, Brian Katulis, and Caroline Wadhams
• Osama's Death Unites Americans that Came of Age After 9/11 by Sam Fulwood III

Late on a clear, cool, spring Sunday night, a dozen or so young people rushed to the north side gate that separates the White House from a large public park in downtown Washington, D.C. They waved flags that fluttered shimmering stars on a blue background, rippled by red and white stripes. They chanted “U.S.A.! U.S.A.!” over and over. A few broke into song, a full-throated, if off-key version of “The Star-Spangled Banner.”

On the other side of the iron gate, President Barack Obama prepared to tell the world that Navy SEALs had successfully followed his orders and killed Osama bin Laden. But the unofficial news had already seeped into the streets. Twitter and Facebook feeds circulated like rush-hour traffic, mixing fact and rumor with the frenzy of expectant optimism. Televised talking heads said it was so, reporting confirmation that the world’s top terrorist had been shot dead in a 40-minute firefight with U.S. servicemen.

As young people came, they were joined by others in a spontaneous outpouring of celebration. Business travelers put aside work or bedtime to walk from Washington’s luxury hotels to see it for themselves. Suburbanites rushed to the city center. One young man drove from Delaware to be at the center of the action after seeing it on CNN. It was reminiscent of the climatic scene in the movie “Close Encounters of the Third Kind,” where wide-eyed people drew together, as if pulled by a human magnet. The need to be together was inexplicable, part curiosity and part emotional, a compelling desire to be in physical proximity with others who have shared the same feelings and experiences.

Osama bin Laden’s death is a punctuation mark for this generation. In earlier epochs, defining moments such as the Great Depression, World War II, the assassinations of President John Kennedy and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., the humiliating withdrawal from Saigon, and Watergate’s deceit defined the social and political contours of young lives in their respective generations.

For the folks who’ve come of age in the early 21st century, few will ever forget the celebration following bin Laden’s death. Whether in Washington’s Lafayette Park or at Ground Zero in New York City, the young people who raced to be among their peers shared the experience as a defining moment, a bookend to the loss of security that homeland terrorism cast upon the entirety of their lives.

Ann Garcia, 23, was in the ninth grade on September 11, 2001, when the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers fell. “All my life has been defined by what Osama bin Laden did,” she said. “I have mixed feelings about hearing that he has been killed. I’m relieved that he can’t harm anyone else, but I’ve been reading a lot of statements from people in my generation. We’re conflicted about celebrating someone’s death.”

Garcia pointed to her computer screen where feeds from her Facebook friends commented on the biggest news story of the day. She focused on the one that quoted Mark Twain: “I’ve never wished a man dead, but I have read some obituaries with great pleasure.”

“That’s how I feel,” she said softly.

Annabel Hogg, 23, was about to retire for the night when her BlackBerry beeped with an email alert from The New York Times. She dressed quickly, grabbed her digital camera, and sped several blocks downtown on her bike to Lafayette Park. She arrived shortly after midnight and lingered in the crowd for more than an hour.

“It was crazy,” she said. “People were still pouring in when I left.”

For the party-like atmosphere, Hogg was left a bit uncomfortable and shocked by her reactions. There was, she said, something churlish about cheering and celebrating the death of a human being, even Osama bin Laden’s, widely and uniformly viewed among her peers as evil incarnate.

“I don’t feel right about someone dying,” she told me a day later when we arrived at our offices. “But I understand the emotions and how they were released. I have and people of my generation have been profoundly affected by 9/11.”

Hogg compared the scene in Lafayette Park to being in the same spot on the night Barack Obama was elected president. She was a student at American University then and felt compelled to celebrate with other students. “My pictures look the same, people cheering with jubilation and excitement, but the feeling I get from them is very different. One set was about hope and pride; the other set about relief and confused excitement,” she said.

Still, she’s disquieted by the cheering and gloating over one man’s death because it represents such strong and mixed emotions. She’s not sure she wants to post the pictures she took on her Facebook page because she’s still hurt and confused by what the celebratory scene really means.

“Maybe I’m more angry because of what Osama represented,” she said. “He caused 9/11 and by doing so, he took away what the country had been before, one without terror alerts and men in caves who we are told want to kill us.”

So what now that Osama bin Laden is dead? The young people still fear terrorism. But could it really be that the worst of the terrorist nightmare, the scourge of a generation, has eased? If so, that helps explain the conflicted and complicated reactions of the young people who spilled into the streets. They were there to be among their peers, in the mix of relief and hope. To cheer, chant, and sing of an America they’ve never known and so desperately want to hold.

Sam Fulwood III is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress.

See also:

• After bin Laden: Implications for U.S. Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan by Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman
• Another Way to Fight Terrorism by Sarah Margon
• The bin Laden Aftermath by Brian Katulis
• The Force of Special Forces by Lawrence Korb
• A Chance for America and Pakistan to Enhance Coordination to Fight Common Threats by Peter Juul, Brian Katulis, and Caroline Wadhams

Al Qaeda’s devastating 2001 attacks on the United States undoubtedly made Osama bin Laden the most wanted terrorist on the planet. His recent death—and the well-conceived plan that enabled it—is a tremendous victory for the Obama administration that should be heralded. But as spontaneous displays of elation erupt around the world, we must acknowledge that the terrorist threats to our national security do not die with bin Laden.

Since 9/11 we have seen some important successes in the fight against terrorism, including the disruption of terrorist financing networks, the interruption and prevention of attacks both at home and abroad, and a significantly narrower global operating space for terrorists. But the growth and strengthening of multiple local Al Qaeda franchises indicates the need to further shift our policy approach to ensure our long-term security.

The State Department’s 2009 “Country Reports on Terrorism” rightly notes that the Al Qaeda threat has become more dispersed and more geographically diversified in recent years. The Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, has undertaken multiple attacks against the United States and its allies since its founding in January 2009. Some of these attacks were more successful than others but there’s little doubt they will continue.

A lesser-known affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, which is based in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa’s Sahel region, has dramatically upped its kidnapping and killing of westerners in recent months. Many believe they were responsible for last week’s attack in Morocco.

Even the Somali-based al-Shabab, which maintains loose ties with Al Qaeda, recently undertook its first international operation in Uganda during the 2010 World Cup. Unfortunately, the attack succeeded and more than 70 people were killed, including Americans. Al-Shabab spokesmen have already communicated that they plan to take revenge for bin Laden's death with "destructive explosions."

The 2009 “Country Reports” goes on to note that “[a]lthough the al Qaeda core in Pakistan remains the most significant threat to the United States, efforts to expand its operational capabilities by partnering with other terrorist groups remained a top priority for the organization.” Clearly Al Qaeda achieved this goal.

Bin Laden’s death may render Al Qaeda central’s fate uncertain for the time being. But we should be under no illusions that the global network of affiliates—no matter how loosely connected—is about to crumble.

Just last week, at a conference in Washington, D.C., Ambassador Dan Benjamin, the State Department’s coordinator for the Office of Global Terrorism, once again reminded us that “[w]hile the AQ core has weakened operationally, the affiliates have become stronger … [and that] this shift in activity towards the affiliates has been underway for some time.” The death of Osama bin Laden has great potential to reinforce that shift.

The Obama administration has an important opportunity to shift its counterterrorism policy toward a comprehensive approach that boldly recalibrates and adapts to a dramatically changed landscape. This opportunity is only reinforced by the uprisings across the Arab world, which are an unequivocal rejection of Al Qaeda’s fundamental principles.

The administration should consider these suggestions:

Lose the country-by-country approach

The Obama administration should craft a more comprehensive approach that focuses on the transnational, interconnected nature of global terrorism instead of focusing on a country-by-country approach to fight terrorism. The increasing ability for the local Al Qaeda affiliates to act quasi-independently while still maintaining critical links to Al Qaeda central means we need to be smart about engagement. Anticipating and preventing attacks requires a strategic focus that doesn’t get stuck in one part of the world indefinitely. Given the finite resources available, being smart means being strategic in our deployment of resources—both financial and materiel. Getting caught off guard or underestimating a potential safe haven because we’re too narrowly focused on one country or one region could result in an ad hoc response that jeopardizes our security instead of enhancing it.

Reflect on local conditions

We also need to consider the impact of local conditions on our ability to partner with local actors. A more global approach means factoring local elements into the overarching strategy in order to facilitate better decision making.

Consider these questions: How willing and able are local governments to work together to combat cross-border threats, such as in the case of Mali and Algeria? How do development concerns—such as water scarcity or rampant corruption in a pre-revolutionary Yemen—impact commitment to focus on the threats that are our top priorities? How can we help build a functional central government in Somalia in order to decrease opportunities for terrorists to operate there? How can our foreign assistance contribute to economic growth and support the many unemployed youth throughout North Africa and the Middle East, who might be otherwise open to recruitment by terrorist groups?

Crafting a meaningful, sustainable strategy to fight terrorism requires finding the right balance between understanding critical local conditions and being able to respond to legitimate threats from around the world.

Centralize human rights and governance

Al Qaeda affiliates—from Algeria to Yemen—thrive on political instability as well as by associating America with autocratic regimes such as those that have recently been toppled in Egypt and Tunisia. The United States can no longer be seen as complicit in the denial of freedom and human dignity if it actively and openly supports human rights, accountability, and the rule of law.

Engaging beyond government officials—as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has increasingly sought to do—can help bolster genuine efforts at democratic reform. Employing a two-pronged approach that works closely with governments and civil society can help readjust our foreign policy goals to embrace these core values at the same time that it further undermines Al Qaeda’s objectives.

Get our diplomats out and about

Our diplomats work in tough environments but they still should be encouraged to get out of embassy compounds for regular meetings with representatives from the local community. These meetings help diplomats gain better access to open-source information and understand local dynamics, and they can also help reshape the face of America by encouraging the growth of individual relationships and networks.

The death of bin Laden and the uprisings throughout the Middle East and North Africa present an essential window for the Obama administration to shift toward a more globalized, wide-ranging counterterrorism policy. Some of the measures outlined above are already underway but a more pronounced effort is needed. We can better address our security concerns while helping to build legitimate democratic partners around the world by implementing a global approach that focuses on the decentralization of Al Qaeda, incorporates local dynamics, prioritizes human rights and the rule of law, and bolsters the work of our diplomats.

Sarah Margon is the Associate Director for the Sustainable Security program at American Progress.

See also:

• After bin Laden: Implications for U.S. Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan by Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman
• The bin Laden Aftermath by Brian Katulis
• Osama's Death Unites Americans that Came of Age After 9/11 by Sam Fulwood III
• The Force of Special Forces by Lawrence Korb
• A Chance for America and Pakistan to Enhance Coordination to Fight Common Threats by Peter Juul, Brian Katulis, and Caroline Wadhams