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Akiva Eldar
Israel's excuses are running out
by Akiva Eldar
In the mid-1980s, when the government considered allowing elections in the
territories, Henry Kissinger warned an Israeli friend that the territory in
which the Palestinian people will elect its leaders will not remain in
Israel's hands. Sooner or later, said the professor-statesman, the
combination of a people, elections and territory will push Israel back to
the 1967 borders. Twenty years and thousands of Israeli and Palestinian
victims later, Kissinger's prophecy seems more realistic than ever: The
people that dwells in Palestine (and not in the diaspora) elected its
leader yesterday. And not only that: Israel is completing the preparations
for a departure from all of the Gaza Strip and a small part of the West Bank.
These lines were written a few hours before the results of the elections in
the territories became known. However, one can hazard a guess that the
Palestinians (including those in East Jerusalem) elected Mahmoud Abbas (Abu
Mazen) as chairman of the Palestinian Authority. Television networks from
dozens of countries have broadcast to the world pictures of the lines at
the polling stations in Nablus and Hebron, and have reported on the
attempts by Hamas to disrupt the democratic process. In between, the
correspondents reported on the letters of refusal to serve by reserve
officers and on the threats by the Jewish settlers in the territories to
revolt when the government of Israel orders - legally - their evacuation
from the Gaza Strip and northern West Bank.
The elections in the territories and the disengagement plan have created a
certain symmetry between the mainstream on the Israeli side and the
mainstream on the Palestinian side. Both here and there, pragmatism is
challenging fanaticism and democracy is defending itself from theocracy.
Abu Mazen, like Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, will be judged by his ability
to realize the will of the majority - the life breath of democracy - giving
maximum consideration to a majority that will express its opposition in
peaceful ways. The Palestinians' challenge is many times greater: to
institute law and order under occupation, in conditions of poverty and despair.
Learning all the wrong facts
by Akiva Eldar
Israeli politicians periodically cite Palestinian textbooks as damning
proof that the Palestinians are continuing to educate to hatred and not to
peace. The last one to do so was Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who called
for making the curriculum the acid test of the new Palestinian leadership.
The Fatah movement's candidate, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), picked up the
gauntlet, but immediately threw one of his own at the Ministry of
Education: You want to examine our education for peace? Help yourself, but
based on the principle of reciprocity, we should also see what's happening
on the Israeli side.
It isn't at all certain that on this test the Israeli education system
would get a higher grade than its Palestinian neighbor. Although it is hard
to find in Israeli textbooks incidences of blatant incitement, as is often
found in Jordanian and Egyptian textbooks, Dr. Ruth Firer of Hebrew
University, one of the pioneers of textbook research, argues that the
indoctrination in the Israeli books is simply more sophisticated.
For this reason, she says, the messages penetrate all the more effectively.
It is harder to detect a stereotype that is concealed by a seemingly
innocent icon, she says, than one that is worded such that it "vulgarly
pulls you by the nose."
Findings of a study she conducted together with Dr. Sami Adwan of Bethlehem
University, who specializes in peace education and human rights, recently
appeared in a book published by the Georg Eckert Institute for
International Textbook Research in Germany, entitled "The
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in History and Civics Textbooks of Both
Nations." The study encompassed 13 Israeli textbooks (2,682 pages) and nine
Palestinian textbooks (1,207 pages), and revealed a sort of mirror image in
which each side pins responsibility for the violence on the other.
Pulling Out - in Jerusalem, Too
by Akiva Eldar
On the Friday when the late Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat
was buried in the courtyard of the Muqata, the media reported that because
of the fear of riots, the Israeli government had decided to close the
Temple Mount mosques to residents of the territories. From this prohibition
it could have been understood that on an ordinary holiday, masses of Arabs
from Ramallah and from Hebron are allowed to come to Jerusalem to pray at
the holy site. And the listener will wonder: If the gates of Jerusalem
(which is an Israeli and united city, as we know) are regularly open to the
residents of the territories, what are those ugly separation fences that
surround East Jerusalem? And, on the contrary: If the capital is wide open,
why do the city's Arabs need the permission of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon to vote at the polls in Abu Dis?
Absent presence
by Akiva Eldar
It is said that when Metternich, Austrian chancellor in the 1830s, was
informed of the death (in 1838) of the person he hated most, French foreign
minister Talleyrand, he commented: "I wonder what he intends." Apparently
the debate over whether Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat is a
real partner for a two-state solution or a charlatan who has never ceased
to aim at the destruction of the State of Israel will not end even after
his death.
Even in the Israeli peace camp, those who will shed a tear can be counted
on the fingers of one hand. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak will not be one of them. As
head of Military Intelligence, as chief of staff, as a government minister
who participated in the second Camp David summit and as one of the leaders
of the Geneva Initiative, he has accumulated scores of hours of observation
of the Palestinian leader. Lipkin-Shahak, who was involved up to his neck
in the negotiations for the second Oslo agreement, is convinced, on the one
hand, that at the end of the 1980s, when the Palestine Liberation
Organization adopted the two-state solution, and in the early 1990s, when
he signed the Oslo agreements, Arafat was the right person at the right
time. Only an authoritative leader like him could have made what looked to
many Palestinians like very painful concessions on issues such as
territory, Jerusalem and the refugees. On the other hand, Arafat kept in
his own hands most of the power and during the past four years made use of
it in a way that led to the breakup of Fatah, the increase in terror and a
bankrupt leadership.
