Terrorism and Nonviolence: Two Paths of Resistance
Why do some movements turn to attacks on civilians while others choose nonviolent struggle? The Palestinian experience offers evidence for both, and a clear verdict on which path wins more support.
In June 2004, at the height of the second intifada, a debate ran through Palestinian and international activist circles: could the tactics of Gandhi work in Palestine? Two decades later, the question remains central to how movements everywhere think about resistance.
Two logics
Terrorism, the deliberate targeting of civilians for political ends, rests on the belief that inflicting pain will force an opponent to change course. Nonviolent resistance rests on a different theory. Mass participation, moral pressure and the withdrawal of cooperation raise the costs of domination and split the opponent's supporters.
Research on resistance movements has found that nonviolent campaigns in the twentieth century succeeded more often than violent ones. The most cited work is by the political scientists Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan. Their explanation is that nonviolence attracts far broader participation and makes repression politically costly.
The Palestinian record
Palestinian history includes both paths:
- The first intifada (1987–1993) relied heavily on mass civil disobedience: strikes, boycotts, tax refusal and stone-throwing youths rather than armed attacks. It drew worldwide sympathy and helped bring about the Oslo process.
- The second intifada (2000–2005) was dominated by armed operations, including suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. Israeli public opinion hardened, the separation barrier was built, and international sympathy shifted.
- Village campaigns against the barrier, in places such as Budrus and Bil'in, used weekly nonviolent protests and legal action. In some cases they won changes to the barrier's route.
Why the choice is hard
Advocates of nonviolence have always faced objections. Critics call nonviolence naive in the face of overwhelming military power, and point to protesters who are shot or imprisoned anyway. Many leading Palestinian practitioners of nonviolence were deported, jailed or ignored. That lent weight to those who argued that nothing but force would be heard.
The verdict
The evidence does not suggest that nonviolence is guaranteed to succeed. It suggests that it has better odds, and that its costs fall far less heavily on civilians on both sides. Terrorism, by contrast, has consistently damaged the causes it claims to serve, handing opponents a justification for harsher measures.
For anyone concerned with ending occupation rather than perpetuating conflict, that is the central lesson of the Palestinian experience.